Signatures for Sale
This report analyzes a family of related corporate arrangements in which nominees act as agents of principals in control of shell companies. It focuses on how nominee arrangements can be abused to facilitate financial crime by obscuring the identity of those in control of shell companies and on poli...
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| Principais autores: | , |
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| Formato: | Online |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Publicado em: |
Washington, DC: World Bank
2022
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| Assuntos: | |
| Acesso em linha: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099233504212213207/IDU001f26893087ae0443108a610078194d7562a https://hdl.handle.net/10986/37335 |
| _version_ | 1866367877298257920 |
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| author | Nielson, Daniel Lafayette Sharman, Jason Campbell |
| author_facet | Nielson, Daniel Lafayette Sharman, Jason Campbell |
| author_sort | Nielson, Daniel Lafayette |
| collection | Colección Libros - Series (activas) |
| description | This report analyzes a family of related corporate arrangements in which nominees act as agents of principals in control of shell companies. It focuses on how nominee arrangements can be abused to facilitate financial crime by obscuring the identity of those in control of shell companies and on policies designed to counter such abuses. The report draws evidence from a global mystery shopping exercise based on thousands of solicitations for shell companies, as well as marketing information from shell company providers, and journalistic and policy research on the topic.
Nominee arrangements are currently both a threat and a missed opportunity for policy makers. Such arrangements are critical to corporate beneficial ownership transparency as a major but underappreciated point of vulnerability. Strengthening the regulation of nominee arrangements can enhance the transparency of shell companies and help reduce financial crime. Taking best advantage of this opportunity requires greater attention to the transparency of nominee arrangements, better practical enforcement of rules, and replacement of a single country-by-country approach in national evaluations with a more multijurisdictional perspective. |
| format | Online Report |
| id | wb-10986-37335 |
| institution | Banco Mundial |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publisher | Washington, DC: World Bank |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | wb-10986-373352025-05-26T05:26:21Z Signatures for Sale How Nominee Services for Shell Companies are Abused to Conceal Beneficial Owners Nielson, Daniel Lafayette Sharman, Jason Campbell REDUCTION OF CORRUPTION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STAR INITIATIVE FINANCIAL CRIME MONEY LAUNDERING This report analyzes a family of related corporate arrangements in which nominees act as agents of principals in control of shell companies. It focuses on how nominee arrangements can be abused to facilitate financial crime by obscuring the identity of those in control of shell companies and on policies designed to counter such abuses. The report draws evidence from a global mystery shopping exercise based on thousands of solicitations for shell companies, as well as marketing information from shell company providers, and journalistic and policy research on the topic. Nominee arrangements are currently both a threat and a missed opportunity for policy makers. Such arrangements are critical to corporate beneficial ownership transparency as a major but underappreciated point of vulnerability. Strengthening the regulation of nominee arrangements can enhance the transparency of shell companies and help reduce financial crime. Taking best advantage of this opportunity requires greater attention to the transparency of nominee arrangements, better practical enforcement of rules, and replacement of a single country-by-country approach in national evaluations with a more multijurisdictional perspective. 2022-04-26T13:30:19Z 2022-04-26T13:30:19Z 2022-04-21 Report Rapport Informe http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099233504212213207/IDU001f26893087ae0443108a610078194d7562a https://hdl.handle.net/10986/37335 10.1596/37335 English CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank application/pdf text/plain Washington, DC: World Bank |
| spellingShingle | REDUCTION OF CORRUPTION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STAR INITIATIVE FINANCIAL CRIME MONEY LAUNDERING Nielson, Daniel Lafayette Sharman, Jason Campbell Signatures for Sale |
| title | Signatures for Sale |
| title_full | Signatures for Sale |
| title_fullStr | Signatures for Sale |
| title_full_unstemmed | Signatures for Sale |
| title_short | Signatures for Sale |
| title_sort | signatures for sale |
| topic | REDUCTION OF CORRUPTION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STAR INITIATIVE FINANCIAL CRIME MONEY LAUNDERING |
| url | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099233504212213207/IDU001f26893087ae0443108a610078194d7562a https://hdl.handle.net/10986/37335 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT nielsondaniellafayette signaturesforsale AT sharmanjasoncampbell signaturesforsale AT nielsondaniellafayette hownomineeservicesforshellcompaniesareabusedtoconcealbeneficialowners AT sharmanjasoncampbell hownomineeservicesforshellcompaniesareabusedtoconcealbeneficialowners |